The Law Enforcement technology development community has a growing interest in the technologies associated with gunshot detection and localization. These interests revolve around community-oriented policing. Technologies of interest include those associated with muzzle blast and bullet shockwave detection and the inter-netting of these acoustic sensors with electro-optic sensors. To date, no one sensor technology has proven totally effective for a complete solution. PSI has a muzzle blast detection and localization product which is wireless, highly mobile and reconfigurable, with a user-friendly laptop processor and display unit, which completed a one-year demonstration in Austin, Texas on July 6, 2002. This demonstration was conducted under a Cooperative Agreement with the National Institute of Justice and in cooperation with the Austin Police Department. This paper will discuss the details of the demonstrations, provide a summarized evaluation, elucidate the lessons learned, make recommendations for future deployments and discuss the developmental directions indicated for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Planning Systems Incorporated (PSI) was awarded a Cooperative Agreement Grant entitled, "SECURES® Urban Gunshot Detection System Demonstration at Austin, Texas", (Grant #2000-9204-VA-IJ), in the amount of $770,000 on 29 June 2000. The effort included a six-month manufacture and test phase and a year-long demonstration in Austin, Texas. This paper will endeavor to describe many of the details of the eighteen-month effort, including:
-Implementation issues -Data collection and analysis procedures -Operational results observed -Summary of lessons learned -Recommendations for future applications A most thorough demonstration period was concluded on 6 July 2002, with the material to be used in the final report received at the end of August 2002. This demonstration project was successfully concluded on 31 August 2002.
SECURES® / AUSTIN DEMONSTRATION OVERVIEW
The project was designed in two parts, the first was the technical deployment and the second was the assessment of the police use.
A. Technical Framework The technical framework included:
-Determination of the deployment location in coordination with the Austin Police Department (APD), three locations were evaluated, the one selected by the APD was statistically the "highest crime against person" area; -Determination of which utility poles to mount the sensor units and associated scheduling in coordination with Austin Utility; -Determination of the location of the base station receiver antenna, computer equipment, and which city local area network (LAN) to use in coordination with the City of Austin LAN Administration; -Determination of the proper location of the laptop display in the APD Dispatch Center; and -Conduct of RF surveys to ensure line-of-sight communication from the sensor units to the base station receiver antenna on the Waller Creek Building.
The following figures (Figures 1 -3) indicate the decisions made. Figure 4 is the demonstration schedule generally adhered to. 
B.
Assessment Framework The assessment framework was developed by the University of New Orleans, Center for Society, Law and Justice in coordination with APD. The following summarizes the approach.
Overall Project Aim and Goals: The overall aim of the project was to assess the applicability of the SECURES® gunshot detection in the Austin Police Department and Austin Community. To achieve this broad aim the following goals were defined:
1. Implement SECURES® within the Austin Police Department; 2. Provide training to the APD related to the use of SECURES® to support the program; 3. Provide data to an evaluation team to objectively assess the impact of the SECURES® technology; and 4. Work with this evaluation team to help assess the technology in its application within Austin.
Assessment Strategy: The general strategy to be proposed to the evaluation team to be selected by NIJ included:
• The process of implementation of a complex and new technology into the realities of a working police department; and • The impact of the SECURES® technology on the agency's broadly understood crime fighting capacity.
Major Aims of the Assessment: Aim One:
To describe the process of implementation of the SECURES® system within Austin: key to achieving this aim will be to document the types of factors that might effect the outcome of the experiment including organizational variables, changes in assignment, shifts in priorities, etc. Aim Two:
To assess some of the major effects of the system upon police operations, crime, and community satisfaction within Austin; essential to achieving this aim is collecting data related to police performance that might change were SECURES® to have a strong impact upon police operations. Aim Three:
To analyze the costs/benefits associated with the implementation of the SECURES® technology: what are some of the implementation costs in relationship to benefits. Aim Four:
To define a policy framework to help law enforcement administrators effectively implement this type technology in their agencies and assess its utility to crime fighting operations that facilitates future uses.
CSLJ Role: The Center for Society, Law and Justice was tasked to develop but not actually execute the research design that provides the basis for the performance assessment of the system. This development created the foundation of the ability to complete the performance assessment. The task of actual assessment was to be assigned to a third-party evaluation entity to be named by NIJ.
Assessment Framework: The information for the assessment will flow from raw data stored by the department and from interviews conducted based on the Austin SECURES® Interview Matrix (see Figure 5 ). How the technology affects crime and the community is dependent not only on the accuracy and effectiveness of the system and its software, but on the way the information is actually used during the implementation. For example, if the SECURES® generated calls are assigned a low priority by the dispatching system, many of the potential benefits from rapid response and information development perspectives will be lost. Therefore, the evaluation must measure implementation process and organizational acceptance as well as technical effectiveness. As a result, a number of considerations and specific target assessment issues must be considered when developing the framework for the assessment. Specifically, the evaluation must include the following:
• Process Evaluation Considerations;
• Outcome Evaluation Considerations;
• System Accuracy Factors;
• Police Workload Effects;
• Response Time Effects;
• Usefulness in COP/POP Strategy;
• Attitude Factors;
• Policy and Procedure Factors;
• Crime Prevention Effects;
• Community Effects; and • Computer and Recorded Data Collection Factors.
Figure 5: Austin SECURES® Interview Evaluation Matrix
Recommended Assessment Schedule and Milestones: Figure 6 depicts this recommendation.
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DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
A. Technical Data A remote (internet access) data collection process was instituted in coordination with the City of Austin's Information Systems Department (ISD) and the APD Dispatch Office.
The following steps were instituted:
1. The SECURES® base station receiver antenna was located on the roof of the City's Waste and Water Department's building (Waller Creek Building). Significant was the fact that the City's ISD's municipal LAN management and computer operations were located on the ninth floor. 2. The SECURES® base station computer was co-located with the City's, allowing for joint monitoring and calls for maintenance from ISD personnel. 3. ISD and PSI coordinated the interfacing of the SECURES® base station computer to the LAN connected to the Dispatch Office. 4. The SECURES® APD Dispatch Office display was co-located with the dispatch operator for the Central East Police District, where the demonstration area was embedded. Figures 7 and 8 show the laptop, and representative screens, and the operator tools provided are discussed. 5. In order to make the SECURES® base station computer internet accessible, ISD made available an existing "DMZ" for access outside of the City's firewall, in which, PSI arranged for computer security. PSI then monitored and collected technical data on the sensor unit and laptop display operations status, and collected the data for technical evaluation. PSI's Reston office laptop display was the same as located in the Dispatch Office.
The SECURES® Dispatcher's screen provided powerful tools that enabled the Dispatcher to detect and monitor events, collect data, and dispatch patrol officers to the precise location of a gunshot.
• Provides audio and visual alerts within seconds after the shot is fired; • Automatically zooms to and displays a gunshot's location on an aerial photograph; • Displays the gunshot's date, time and geographical coordinates; • Displays the location of the pole units that detected the shot; • Automatically identifies the address nearest to the gunshot; and • Displays a cumulative history of gunshot events The following Dispatcher's tools provided assistance to the dispatcher in sending a patrol officer to the precise location:
• Arbitrary address look-up;
• High resolution aerial photographs with pan and zoom;
• Simultaneous display of additional graphical overlays, including roadways, contour lines, and buildings; and • On-screen distance measurements from shot location to arbitrary reference points
B.
Operational Data UNO/CSLJ was responsible for setting up the data collection processes, which included APD operational training, APD process change and liaison activities between PSI and APD.
Data Collection: Interviews were conducted to gather information both to guide the implementation of the project and to serve process evaluation requirements. All interviews were conducted with the full consent of the APD in accordance with APD needs. Both individual and group brainstorming session interviews were conducted within APD.
Interviews created the potential for bottom-up and top-down buy-in for the project. The process began with the interview of senior managers and spread to include the cadre of personnel involved with the SECURES® implementation and its day-to-day operations. They focused on policy development and problem solving issues as well as project familiarization. Training and policy recommendations built on information obtained during interviews. Post equipment installation interviews ensured the system was performing as desired and contributed to the potential Community Oriented Policing (COP) problem-solving capacities that arose during the project. Interviews conducted regarding implementation included the following specific topics:
• General layout of the City of Austin, and more specifically the targeted area to include residential population density, general topography, and crime trends; • Current protocols/experiences with citizen reported gunshots to include response priority, numbers, locations and times; • CAD infrastructure and dispatch procedures;
• Current response time to gunshot incidents (actual, projected, desired);
• Information regarding gunshot incidents that is considered of value to include all relevant crime mapping and crime analysis data; • Test relationship to potential crime mapping for analysis and potential problem solving;
• Desired location parameters dispatched reference an incident; • Community involvement; • Test disclosure issues; • Live fire testing; and • System reliability and accuracy.
Formal Training: Training sessions were conducted just prior to final installation of the SECURES® equipment. Sessions included a cross section of APD personnel with direct and support responsibilities regarding the test as determined in cooperation with APD. The focus and topics for the training were drawn from the interviews and APD policy concerns. The sessions were held to a minimum and designed using adult learning strategies. Additional training sessions were provided based on developed needs throughout the project.
Coordination of SECURES® Implementation: CSLJ supported PSI installation activities and APD installation concerns. Presence at community meetings and other functions directly related to the implementation was provided as guided by APD. CSLJ internal liaison and training helped coordinate and support the implementation process. Policy changes needed by the project were minimized. Past experience has shown, however, that SECURES®-type systems generate a large increase in potential calls for service which entails important policy considerations. Changes were made in instances that maximized the opportunity for success in the use of SECURES® within reasonable bounds as determined by APD. Liaison and interviews created a wealth of information that allowed for APD policy development and adjustment. A preliminary list of policy concerns were as follows:
• Dispatch process;
• Call priority;
• Response procedures;
• Investigative procedures; and • Event documentation.
Over a short period of time, the SECURES® process was integrated and became transparent to normal police standard operating procedures.
Research Information: CSLJ made assurances that every effort was made to use existing APD systems in the collection of the data and information required to assess the performance of SECURES®. This information also served the purpose of assisting the APD with maintaining the operational effectiveness of SECURES®. Information retained for research purposes were direct products of the interview and policy development processes. Additional specific data and information collection within the designed CSLJ framework by the NIJ designated project assessor/evaluation team never materialized. The recommended timetable for assessment activities is identified in Figure 9 . 
CONCLUSIONS
This section will attempt to summarize the cogent information needed to permit replication of the SECURES® / Austin demonstration design and implementation. It is important to quote a past International Association Chiefs of Police (IACP) President, Chief William B. Berger, in an IACP article for "The Police Chief" magazine stating, to wit, "benefits of any new technology tools will not be realized until operational processes are re-engineered." PSI and UNO/CSLJ certainly learned this to be true in the Austin implementation experience.
A. Implementation Issues
Because SECURES® is a mobile, wireless and independent system not requiring substantial interface with existing systems, a number of implementation elements have been identified and documented. The final reconciliation of these diverse, but integratable, elements will ultimately determine the cost of the project -both near and far term. These implementation elements include:
• Dispatch/911 interface operations;
• District police officer operations;
• City LAN support availability;
• City operations facilities availability;
• Utility company support availability; and • Proposed sensor locations.
B. Operational Results Observed/Reported
The day-to-day results were documented at the Dispatch Center using APD standard operating procedures with the exception that SECURES® identified events were annotated with an attribution to a SECURES® report. Until late December 2001, the project officer assigned at the Central East Police substation was reducing these officer reports to a matrix form for easy review. Figure 10 is an example of the compiled reporting being tracked.
The SECURES® system went operational in Austin on July 6, 2001. In the intervening period ending in December 2001, SECURES® reported several significant events that demonstrated its potential as a valuable tool in community policing.
July 23:
"Officer responding to a SECURES® activation spotted a vehicle leaving the location, stopped it for a traffic violation, the driver was arrested on outstanding warrants and a pistol was found in the car" August 7:
"Officers used SECURES® sensors lack of activation to prove no gunshot was fired in response to a citizen's false complaint." August 11:
"Officer responding to a SECURES® activation determined that a funeral director had neglected to notify the APD that a twenty-one gun salute was to be rendered at the Texas State Cemetery." October 17:
"SECURES® identified two shots emanating from a speeding vehicle providing direction and rate-of-advance. Report was confirmed by four 911 calls and two witnesses." While officers experienced concern about SECURES® sensitivity to fireworks, which caused PSI to conduct modifications to correct in January 2002, in fact, reading through the dispatch reports show indications of gunshot events not subsequently resolved. The report indicated that the demonstration had been quite successful in indicating the potential for use of SECURES® in community policing, however, there had not been sufficient gunshot incidents to prove a valid statistical inference toward the overall utility of SECURES® as a tool to assist in reducing the gun violence in at-risk neighborhoods, in general.
Salient points of the SECURES® operation in Austin to that date, included:
• System operates reliably, and as advertised, such that the Austin Police Department has been able to take ownership and conduct operations without the need for continuous support; • Potential has been demonstrated in four different circumstances (one arrest), and even in the case of illegal explosions has accurately indicated the locations; and • System is easily amenable to sensitivity modifications to customize for target location.
Recommendations of the Interim Evaluation Report, included in part:
• The promise of the system suggests the need for further experimentation;
• A broader scope experiment is required in higher crime/shooting event locations; and • Consistent patrol validation needs to be attempted.
In summary, the Report strongly recommended additional deployment in cities with higher incidents of gun violence to continue refining the use of a gunshot detection tool to aid in community policing. The entire Interim Evaluation Report document is on file at the National Institute of Justice.
D.
Lessons Learned/Recommendations While the gunshot detection technology ownership was taken by the APD and SECURES® was demonstrated to be able to operate reliably, efficiently, and accurately; the ability to totally inculcate the SECURES® contribution to community policing operational processes was less successful. The latter was due to a number of circumstances, including:
• Dynamic changes in APD hierarchical leadership and district police, due to a rapid expansion of the police force because of community growth and the events of September 11, 2001; • SECURES® sensitivity to illegal explosives causing a predisposition of patrolmen to discount SECURES® reports (expressed in interviews, but not reflected in the dispatch reports of the individual policeman); • Lack of significant gunfire events in the Austin Demonstration Area (the Central East Project Officer and Sergeants pointed out that assistance in pursuit of suspects in a larger number of gunfire events would have obviated the officer's discontent with illegal explosion detection); and • Lack of timely training to new, oncoming police officers not particularly aware of SECURES® or its purpose or the improvements made since January 2002.
The single most important recommendation to be made is to attach "ownership" of SECURES® to that special police unit mobilized to fight crime in high risk neighborhoods. This will entail SECURES® to be highly mobile and used in a tailored, customized manner dependent upon the nature of the "strike force" tasking and the area to be surveilled.
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